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Abstract: Many multilateral environmental agreements have adopted differentiated rules for 
different countries, based on the recognition of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
(CBDRs) of states. By establishing two rigid groups of countries with and without emissions 
reduction obligations, the intergovernmental climate regime represents the most extreme case of 
such differentiation. The regime has struggled to overcome this rigidity and the resulting political 
deadlock between developing and developed countries. Transnational climate governance (TCG) 
initiatives have emerged as an alternative to provide mitigation, adaptation or finance outside the 
multilateral process. By drawing on synergies between public and private actors, it is hoped that 
they overcome the paralysis of the intergovernmental process. Yet, they take place in the same 
world of unequal peers, with different levels of capacity and responsibility for climate change. 
This article investigates the extent to which such TCG initiatives reflect the CBDR principle. Do 
different types of initiatives - involving different types of actors or with different climate-related 
goals - address differentiation in distinct ways? Does taking account of CBDRs affect the 
membership to transnational initiatives? This article explores these questions empirically by 
analyzing a sample of TCG initiatives in terms of how they include differential treatment of states 
and non-state members. It concludes that TCG initiatives address differentiation in a pragmatic 
way. Most frequently, they either offer participants flexibility in how to implement their 
commitments, or provide support to members from developing countries. Such support is still 
insufficient to address the limited involvement of developing country actors so far. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) include differentiated rules and obligations 
for different groups of countries. The basis of this differentiation in responsibility is the 
recognition, already found in Principles 6 and 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration1, of countries’ 
differing circumstances and levels of contribution to environmental degradation – the so-called 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR principle or CBDRs) of states. 
The resulting differential treatment may consist of less stringent obligations, different timing in 
the application of those obligations (i.e., grace periods, or priority implementation in specially 
affected countries), and/or international assistance in terms of financing, capacity building or 
technology transfer.2 In addition, differential treatment provisions may appear explicitly in treaty 
texts, but they may also be implicit, in the sense that the provision establishes identical treatment 
to all parties, but its application allows consideration of characteristics that vary from country to 
country (e.g., a state's technical and regulatory ability, its resource availability or more generally 
its national circumstances).3 
 
Given the high costs associated with addressing climate change and the extremely unequal 
distribution of the costs and benefits of doing so, it is not surprising that the intergovernmental 
climate change regime – established under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 4  and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol 5  – represents the most extreme 
example of differential treatment between developing and developed countries. 6  A defining 
centrepiece of the regime – both in procedural and in political terms7 – is the categorization of its 
parties into three groups of countries – those listed in Annex I to the Convention (the so-called 
‘Annex I countries’), those listed in Annex II (which is a subset of Annex I), and those not listed 
in either (the ‘non-Annex I countries’). These groups were differentiated in terms of their central 
emissions reduction and reporting obligations, implementation rules, and provision of support.8  
                                                
1 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the United Nations (UN) Conference on 
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 
(Vol. I), 14 June 1992, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
2 L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), 
pp. 93ff. 
3 D.B. Magraw, ‘Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual, and Absolute Norms’ 
(1990) 1 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy, pp. 69-99. 
4 New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: http://unfccc.int. 
5 Kyoto (Japan), 11 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
6 L. Rajamani, ‘The Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of International 
Environmental Law’ (2012) 88(3) International Affairs, pp. 605-23, at 611. 
7 J. Depledge, ‘The Road Less Travelled: Difficulties in Moving between Annexes in the Climate Change 
Regime’ (2009) 9(3) Climate Policy, pp. 273-87, at 273. 
8  Annex I to the UNFCCC, n. 4 above, lists all countries that were member of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1992 and several economies in transition, including 
the Russian Federation, the Baltic states and several Central and Eastern European states. Annex II lists 
only the OECD countries. Art. 4 UNFCCC lays out 3 separate sets of obligations, applicable to these 3 
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It was clear from the outset that both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol would not be 
sufficient to effectively address climate change, but were rather the starting points of a ‘dynamic 
instrument for long-term climate policy’ that would be adapted to accommodate stronger Annex I 
party commitments and new actions by non-Annex I parties.9 In practice, however, differentiation 
between industrialized and developing countries was designed in a way that it is very difficult to 
change, particularly in the Kyoto Protocol. As a result, while several European countries 
uncontroversially acquired Annex I party status under the Convention, two other countries 
experienced significant political hurdles when seeking to access (or leave) an Annex to the 
UNFCCC, so that decisions took several years to materialize.10 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the 
attempts by Belarus and Kazakhstan to be added to the list of parties with reduction targets in the 
first commitment period (2008-2012) were accompanied by long negotiations and were never 
ratified by a sufficient number of parties to enter into force before the end of 2012. While one of 
the reasons for these hurdles were environmental concerns regarding the stringency of the 
proposed targets, the cumbersome amendment procedure required to modify the Protocol’s 
Annex B was a critical stumbling block.11 Many negotiators and scholars have acknowledged that 
this lack of flexibility is problematic, with Depledge arguing, for example, that the ‘division 
between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties has thus become rigid, and increasingly fails to reflect 
the diversity of national circumstances’.12 
 
The annex-based structure is the main expression of the CBDR principle in the climate change 
regime, but it is by no means the only one. The regime grants special recognition and differential 
treatment not just to developing countries in general, but also to further subgroups of countries 
with particular circumstances: economies in transition, which were exempted from the financial 
obligations imposed on the other industrialized countries, and which were granted some 
flexibility in implementing their emissions reduction obligations; 13  developing countries 
vulnerable to climate change; and developing countries ‘whose economies are particularly 
dependent on fossil fuel production, use and exportation’.14 Certain individual countries won 
special recognition, such as Turkey in regard of its low development level despite its membership 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In addition, both the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are filled with contextual provisions that qualify parties’ 
obligations, relating them to their ‘development priorities, objectives and circumstances’, their 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ or specifying that they are to be fulfilled ‘to the 
                                                                                                                                            
groups of parties. A more detailed description of these country categories, their members and respective 
obligations can be found in Depledge, n. 7 above.  
9 J. Depledge, ‘Continuing Kyoto: Extending Absolute Emission Caps to Developing Countries’, in K. 
Baumert (ed.), Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting the Climate, (World Resources 
Institute, 2002), pp. 31-60, at 41. 
10 For more detailed accounts of all these cases, see Depledge, n. 7 above, p. 279; and P. Castro, ‘How and 
Why Are Institutionalized Country Groups with Differential Treatment Created in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Comparative Analysis’, conference paper presented at the Annual 
Convention of the Swiss Political Science Association, Basel (Switzerland), 21-22 Jan. 2016, pp. 21-4. 
11 Arts 20-21 Kyoto Protocol, n. 5 above. 
12 Depledge, n. 9 above, p. 33. See also Depledge, n. 7 above. 
13Art. 4(6) UNFCCC. 
14 Preamble UNFCCC. 
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extent feasible’, ‘to the extent its capacities permit’, or ‘as appropriate’.15 
 
Differential treatment is not only applied to mitigation commitments. Differentiation and, thus, 
CBDRs are also enshrined in the financial, technical, and capacity-building support provisions of 
the UNFCCC, in the provisions about supporting adaptation in developing countries, and even in 
the compliance regime under the Kyoto Protocol. The introduction of measures to facilitate the 
uptake of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and 
later also in countries with fewer than ten registered projects, seeks to improve geographical 
balance and thus to address the equity concerns of those countries that have benefitted less from 
this market mechanism. 
 
Even though in the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, CBDRs already went beyond the Annex I – 
non-Annex I differentiation, and despite increasing recognition of changing global emissions 
profiles and capacities, the climate change regime has in recent years struggled to overcome this 
dichotomous differentiation. It experienced a political deadlock between developing countries 
demanding leadership by the industrialized ones, and the latter asking for meaningful 
participation by the former.16 The Annex-based differentiation started to erode in 2009, when the 
non-binding Copenhagen Accord asked for mitigation actions by non-Annex I countries,17 an idea 
that was taken further in the 2010 Cancún Agreements.18 One year later, in Durban (South Africa), 
a negotiation process was launched towards a post-2020 ‘protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties’.19  
 
The Paris Agreement,20 adopted in December 2015, represents the culmination of this process, as 
it arguably ended the long-standing Annex I/non-Annex I dichotomy. Under the new agreement, 
differentiation is applied in different ways across thematic areas, and in a pragmatic rather than 
ideological or politicized way.21 While all parties are obliged to contribute to mitigation (‘all 
Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious (mitigation) efforts’),22 differentiation is 
achieved as each party determines the type, scope and stringency of its own mitigation 
                                                
15 E.g., Arts 4(1), 4(5), and 12(1) UNFCCC; and Arts 2(1) and 10 Kyoto Protocol. See also Rajamani, n. 2 
above, pp. 199-201. 
16 J. Pauwelyn, ‘The End of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries? Lessons From the Trade and 
Climate Change Regimes’ (2013) 22(1) Review of European Community & International Environmental 
Law, pp. 29-41; M. Prys-Hansen & B. Franz, ‘Change and Stasis: The Institutionalisation of Developing 
Country Mitigation in the International Climate Regime’ (2015) 26(4) Diplomacy & Statecraft, pp. 696-
718. See also Rajamani, n. 6 above, pp. 615-6.  
17 Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 Mar. 2010, p. 4. 
18 Decision 1/CP. 16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 Mar. 2011, p. 
2.  
19 Decision 1/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 Mar. 2012, p. 2 (emphasis added).  
20 Paris (France), 13 Dec. 2015, not yet in force (in UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Twenty-First Session, Addendum, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 Jan. 2016). 
21 L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and 
Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 493-514, at 509. 
22 Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 Jan. 2016, 
p. 22.  
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contribution in a bottom-up pledge and review system. Such self-differentiation introduces a 
more nuanced and flexible way of addressing CBDRs than the old annex-based system, and at the 
same time promotes broader participation. In terms of the transparency framework, differentiation 
is equally subtly introduced by having a uniform system applicable to all parties, which however 
provides for flexibility and support in relation to parties’ capacities. 23  Finally, the Paris 
Agreement clearly continues to assign the core responsibility for the provision of finance to the 
developed countries and recognizes that developing countries require support to effectively 
implement the Agreement.24 However, it departs from the UNFCCC in that it explicitly opens 
possibilities for ‘other countries’ to provide climate finance, thereby also softening the 
developed-developing country divide.25  
 
In parallel to these developments in the intergovernmental climate change regime, transnational 
climate governance (TCG) initiatives have emerged as an alternative to take action in relation to 
mitigation, adaptation or finance outside the multilateral process.26 On the one hand, they are a 
means of supporting and diffusing implementation of climate-related policies and practices at 
different governance levels and by non-state actors, but they are also a response to the apparent 
incapacity of the multilateral climate change regime to address the growing urgency of climate 
change and to adapt to the changing circumstances of the world. Thus, there is a clear trend away 
from the purely intergovernmental policy making and towards a governance system that 
incorporates public and private actors at all levels into norm setting, policy making and norm 
implementation.27  
 
By drawing on synergies between public and private actors, it is hoped that these initiatives 
would overcome the paralysis of the intergovernmental process and be more effective in 
delivering the necessary responses to the climate challenge. However, the environmental 
effectiveness of these initiatives remains debated both academically and politically, particularly 
                                                
23 Rajamani, n. 21 above, p. 511. 
24 Art. 3 Paris Agreement. 
25 Art. 9(2) Paris Agreement. 
26 K. Bäckstrand, ‘Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Rethinking Legitimacy, 
Accountability and Effectiveness’ (2006) 16(5) European Environment, pp. 290-306. H. Bulkeley et al., 
‘Governing Climate Change Transnationally: Assessing the Evidence From a Database of Sixty Initiatives’ 
(2012) 30(4) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, pp. 591-612, at 603. J.F. Green, 
Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance (Princeton 
University Press, 2013). J.F. Green, ‘Order Out of Chaos: Public and Private Rules for Managing Carbon’ 
(2013) 13(2) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 1-25, at 17. T. Hale & C. Roger, ‘Orchestration and 
Transnational Climate Governance’ (2014) 9(1) The Review of International Organizations, pp. 59-82. For 
a more general argument, see also S.D. Krasner & T. Risse, ‘External Actors, State-Building, and Service 
Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction’ (2014) 27(4) Governance, pp. 545-567.  
27 P. Pattberg, ‘The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and Nonprofit Organizations 
Agree on Transnational Rules’ (2005) 18(4) Governance, pp. 589-610. C. Okereke, H. Bulkeley & H. 
Schroeder, ‘Conceptualizing Climate Governance Beyond the International Regime’ (2009) 9(1) Global 
Environmental Politics, pp. 58-78, at 58. F. Biermann, ‘Beyond the Intergovernmental Regime: Recent 
Trends in Global Carbon Governance’ (2010) 2(4) Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, pp. 
284-288, at 285. 
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due to the difficulty of assessing the large variety of instruments represented.28 Still, it is thought 
that beyond direct emissions reduction impacts, these initiatives may help in shaping the climate 
policy discourse and in raising awareness at new societal levels and in countries that otherwise 
have weak climate policies.29  
 
However, recent research has noted that so far, TCG initiatives have been biased towards 
northern countries in terms of leadership, participation, and implementation.30 Such bias may 
affect the legitimacy of these initiatives and affect countries’ positions in the international climate 
negotiations. Some developing countries have, for example, expressed the fear that the 
involvement of private initiatives in mitigation seeks to shift away responsibility from developed 
countries and is rather imposing additional burdens on developing countries. Further involving 
actors from developing countries in TCG initiatives might improve their legitimacy and shield 
them from such criticism.31 It would also help in realizing the above-mentioned goal of improving 
and expanding awareness about the climate challenge. 
 
TCG initiatives take place in the same world of unequal peers, with different levels of capacity 
and responsibility for climate change. While these peers are no longer states, but public and 
private actors at all levels of governance, it may be reasonable to expect that such governance 
initiatives also try to incorporate provisions that level the playing field between their various 
members. In addition, TCG initiatives build upon the multilateral regime, its norms and rules.32 
On a normative level, at least some of these initiatives may seek to conform to the fairness 
principles embodied in the UNFCCC – among them the CBDR principle.  
 
Several questions thus arise: To what extent and in what ways do TCG initiatives reflect the 
CBDR principle? Does reflection of the CBDR principle arise rather from pragmatic 
considerations about improving the inclusiveness of TCG initiatives, or for normative reasons? 
Do different types of initiatives – involving different types of actors or with different climate-
related goals – address differentiation in distinct ways? Does reflecting CBDRs affect the 
membership to TCG initiatives?  
                                                
28 Biermann, n. 27 above, p. 286. See also O. Widerberg & P. Pattberg, Harnessing Company Climate 
Action Beyond Paris (FORES Study 2015:6, FORES, 2015), at 47. K. Michaelowa & A. Michaelowa, 
‘Transnational Climate Initiatives: An Alternative Way to Climate Change Mitigation?’. Conference paper 
presented at the 9th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Salt Lake 
City, 7-9 Jan. 2016. Available at: http://wp.peio.me/the-9th-annual-conference/program-and-papers-2016/. 
29 Biermann, n. 27 above, p. 286. 
30 Bulkeley et al., n. 26 above, p. 601; Widerberg & Pattberg, n. 28 above, p. 22. See also H. Bulkeley, L. 
Andonova, M.M. Betsill, D. Compagnon, T. Hale, M.J. Hoffmann, P. Newell, M. Paterson, S.D. 
VanDeveer & C. Roger, Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2014); 
and S. Chan & H. Van Asselt, ‘Transnational Climate Change Governance and the Global South’. 
Conference paper presented at the Conference ‘Transformative Global Climate Governance Après Paris’ 
Berlin, 23-24 May 2016. But see T. Lee, ‘Global Cities and Transnational Climate Change Networks’ 
(2013) 13(1) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 108-127, at 122-4, which did not find any significant 
effect from being located in an Annex I country or from having a high income level. City participation in 
networks seemed to be more related to how well the city is connected to the globalized world than to 
whether it is located in a developing or a developed country.  
31 Widerberg & Pattberg, n. 28 above, pp. 22-3. 
32 Green, n. 26 above. 
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In this article, I explore these questions empirically by analyzing a sample of TCG initiatives. I 
first classify the initiatives in terms of (i) whether and how they allow for a differentiated 
treatment of their members or of entities within industrialized and developing countries; and of 
(ii) whether and how they align themselves with the CBDR principle at a normative level. I then 
explore possible explanations for the extent and way in which these initiatives institutionalize 
differential treatment. I finally use two more detailed case studies to take a closer look at the 
activities that developing and developed country members perform within such TCG initiatives.  
 
In the next section, I elaborate on how we might expect CBDRs to be reflected in TCG initiatives. 
Section 3 then presents first empirical evidence of whether and how CBDRs have actually been 
addressed in a sample of existing TCG initiatives. Section 4 analyzes the more detailed case 
studies of the Compact of States and Regions and the Compact of Mayors. Concluding remarks 
are presented in section 5. 
 
 
2. COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES BEYOND THE NATION 
STATE 
 
TCG initiatives can be understood as formal and informal processes and institutions, with their 
own rules and compliance procedures, which are agreed upon by sub- and non-state actors from 
at least two countries with the aim of providing climate-related goods.33 Their rise in recent years 
is a response to the perceived long-term inability of the multilateral regime to provide a 
meaningful answer to the need for strong climate change mitigation and widespread adaptation.  
 
TCG initiatives come in many flavours. Their main purpose might be to create a network of 
similar actors that enables them to interact regularly and exchange best practices in a certain issue 
area, such as the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group.34 They may also involve some kind of 
emissions reduction target for local governments (such as the Covenant of Mayors for Climate & 
Energy, 35  which has pledged to implement the European Union (EU) climate and energy 
objectives on their territories) or firms (such as the Climate Savers Computing Initiative36), the 
creation of a fund for sustainable energy projects (e.g., the Strategic Climate Fund37), or the 
establishment of a price for carbon (the Partnership for Market Readiness,38 or the Chicago 
                                                
33 T. Hale & D. Held, Handbook of Transnational Governance (Polity Press, 2011), p. 12. C. Roger, T. 
Hale & L. Andonova, How Do Domestic Politics Shape Participation in Transnational Climate 
Governance? (BSG Working Paper 2015/001, University of Oxford, Blavatnik School of Government, 
2015). Available at: https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/files/documents/BSG-WP-2015-
001.pdf, p. 2. 
34 Available at: http://www.c40.org. See also T. Lee & S.V. de Meene, ‘Who Teaches and Who Learns? 
Policy Learning Through the C40 Cities Climate Network’ (2012) 45(3) Policy Sciences, pp. 199-220.  
35 Available at: http://www.covenantofmayors.eu. 
36 Own website discontinued. Information available at: 
https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=join_change_the_world.showPledgeDriverDetails&cpd
_id=16165. 
37 Available at: http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/node/3. 
38 Available at: https://www.thepmr.org. 
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Climate Exchange39). Their functions can include ‘agenda setting; information sharing; capacity 
building; soft and hard forms of regulation; and integration across different global environmental 
governance arenas’.40 Even though they are agreed upon voluntarily and some of these functions 
entail a rather soft form of shaping the behaviour of their members, TCG initiatives are regarded 
as instances of actual non-state regulation,41 which may help to diffuse new norms and goals, bind 
their members to certain commitments or even establish financial obligations. This wide variety 
of goals implies that different TCG initiatives will impose different levels of costs or provide 
different levels of benefits to their members. This has implications for whether and how they 
address CBDRs: if a TCG initiative is focused on networking and agenda-setting activities as 
opposed to actual regulation or financing, there might be no need to differentiate across members 
because no significant costs or benefits are distributed.     
 
Membership of a TCG initiative may range from just a handful of actors to hundreds. 
Membership may comprise private or public actors or both, including local and regional 
governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society organizations, 
firms ranging from local service providers to large multinational corporations and business 
associations, and various intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) including multilateral banks 
such as the World Bank.42 National governments or various central government agencies may be 
among the initiators of a TCG initiative, and also among its members.43 These different types of 
participants arguably have different levels of financial and technical capabilities and 
responsibility towards climate change. As in the multilateral regime, we would expect TCG 
initiatives involving various types of actors to seek to address these disparities by introducing 
some kind of differentiation, such as financial or technical support, capacity building, or different 
levels of obligations. 
 
Many TCG initiatives consist of networks of similar actors seeking to learn from each other or to 
join forces and raise the profile of their own climate-related activities. This is the case, for 
example, for several city networks such as the C40 network and the Asian Cities Climate Change 
Resilience Network,44 as well as the World Bank-led Networked Carbon Markets Initiative.45 
Other TCG initiatives are created in order to provide third parties (actors that are themselves not 
members of the initiative) with certain climate-related goods and services, including financial 
support or capacity building. 
 
Examples in the latter category include the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership 
(REEEP),46 which invests in clean energy in developing countries and seeks to provide useful 
lessons from these investments, and the various standards and schemes that have been developed 
                                                
39 Available at: https://www.theice.com/ccx. 
40 Bulkeley et al., n. 26 above, p. 595.  
41 Ibid., p. 596. 
42 Roger et al., n. 33 above.  
43 Hale & Roger, n. 26 above. 
44 Available at: http://acccrn.net. 
45 Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/globally-networked-carbon-
markets. 
46 Available at: http://www.reeep.org. 
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for measuring and reporting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, such as the Carbon Disclosure 
Project, 47  the Carbon Trust Standard, 48  the Global GHG Register, 49  the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI),50 the Greenhouse Gas Protocol,51 and the ISO 14064/14065 standards of the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO),52 or for offsetting carbon emissions, such as 
the CarbonFix Standard 53 for forestry projects, the Climate Action Reserve54  or the Green-e 
Climate Standards 55  for projects based in the United States (US). In such cases, when 
membership to a TCG initiative is more homogeneous, the need to address CBDRs through 
differentiation would be reduced.   
 
In sum, given the wide variety of goals and activities introduced by TCG initiatives, and the high 
diversity of potential participants (with both different roles in society and different levels of 
capacity and responsibility towards climate change), it is likely that the costs and benefits of 
participating in such an initiative are unequally distributed across members. Under these 
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect an attempt to level the playing field for their members by 
providing a differentiated treatment. Given the higher stakes at play, we may expect that such 
differentiated treatment is more likely in those TCG initiatives that entail higher costs for their 
members or beneficiaries. While a network created with the aim of exchanging lessons learned 
does not impose high costs to its members, an initiative that requires its members to establish, 
monitor and comply with an emissions reduction target does. An initiative asking for high 
membership fees from its partners (such as the Sustainable Energy Finance Alliance56 or the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Finance Initiative57), which are then reinvested 
in climate-related projects, might be another costly governance initiative. In such cases, we might 
expect that fees are reduced, or technical or financial support is offered to members with lesser 
capacity to deal with these costs, such as those located in developing countries.  
 
At the other extreme, TCG initiatives that offer large benefits to their participants may have to 
consider some kind of differential treatment for the distribution of those benefits. This might be 
the case for REEEP,58 but also for the BioCarbon Fund,59 which provides finance for projects that 
sequester or conserve carbon in developing countries’ forests and agriculture, and the Strategic 
Climate Fund, 60 which supports adaptation, reduced deforestation and renewable energy projects 
in developing countries. 
                                                
47 Available at: https://www.cdp.net. 
48 Available at: https://www.carbontrust.com/client-services/footprinting/footprint-certification/. 
49 Available at: http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00818/WEB/OTHER/GLOBAL-5.HTM. 
50 Available at: https://www.globalreporting.org. 
51 Available at: http://www.ghgprotocol.org. 
52 Available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=38381. 
53 Own website discontinued. Information available at: https://tellitsgreen.com/organic-
logos/1088/carbonfix-standard/. 
54 Available at: http://www.climateactionreserve.org. 
55 Available at: http://www.green-e.org. 
56 Own website discontinued. Information available at: http://energy-base.org/project/previous-
projects/#SEF. 
57 Available at: http://www.unepfi.org. 
58 N. 46 above.  
59 Available at: https://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&ItemID=9708&FID=9708. 
60 N. 37 above.  
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Finally, TCG initiatives have not emerged in a normative vacuum. They exist as a complement to 
the multilateral climate change regime, and in some cases were created as a way to facilitate 
compliance with some of the regime’s provisions or participation in some of its policy 
instruments, such as the international carbon market.61 For this reason, they may be expected to 
adhere to the main principles and ideas governing the multilateral climate change regime, 
including the notion that developed countries should lead the efforts in combating climate change 
due to their stronger financial capabilities and their higher level of historical responsibility 
towards climate change. In this regard, we may observe two implications. Firstly, TCG initiatives 
seeking to emphasize this normative dimension, will do so explicitly on their websites in their 
mission statement. Given that many developed countries have long sought to overcome the 
Annex I – non-Annex I dichotomy institutionalized in the old climate change regime, it is 
unlikely that TCG initiatives launched by these countries would explicitly seek to emphasize the 
CBDR principle. In contrast, initiatives started by actors from developing countries will be more 
likely to emphasize CBDRs on their website. 
 
Secondly, certain TCG initiatives may, in practice, seek to support developing countries’ 
mitigation and adaptation activities in line with UNFCCC norms. In this case, even if we do not 
find an explicit reference to CBDRs or related norms, the TCG initiative will offer some form of 
financial, technical or capacity building support geared specifically towards members from 
developing countries. Table 1 presents an overview of these empirical expectations. 
 
 
Table 1: Empirical expectations regarding differential treatment in TCG initiatives 
TCG initiative entails high costs for members Higher likelihood of differential treatment 
TCG initiative offers large benefits to its 
members 
Higher likelihood of differential treatment 
TCG initiative started by actors from 
developing countries 
Higher likelihood of CBDR being mentioned in 
initiative’s website, mission or vision 
TCG initiative seeks to promote mitigation or 
adaptation in developing countries  
Higher likelihood of differential treatment, 
particularly in terms of support 
 
In the next section, we look for empirical evidence in support of these expectations in a sample of 
existing TCG initiatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
61 For example, the goal of the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund and Prototype Carbon Fund is to pioneer 
emission reduction projects in developing countries that can be used within the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism. See L.B. Andonova, ‘Public-Private Partnerships for the Earth: Politics and 
Patterns of Hybrid Authority in the Multilateral System’ (2010) 10(2) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 
25-53, at 39, for the case of the Prototype Carbon Fund. 
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3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF CBDRs IN EXISTING TRANSNATIONAL CLIMATE 
GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES 
 
Roger et al. have created a dataset of 75 TCG initiatives that were initiated between 1990 and 
2012, and that have jointly engaged participants from 191 countries. 62  Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa have subsequently expanded the dataset, so that it now covers 109 TCG initiatives.63 
These datasets provide information on the main goals and activities, membership and country of 
origin of the TCG initiatives. 
 
For a random subset of 40 of these TCG initiatives, information was collected on whether and 
how they include provisions or activities granting differential treatment to their members or target 
users. This information was obtained mostly from the TCG initiatives’ own websites, but also 
from websites belonging to individual members or founders, or from third-party reports published 
online. Table 2 shows the type of data collected, while Table 3 lists the TCG initiatives analyzed.   
 
Table 2: Information collected on differential treatment in TCG initiatives 
Type of 
differentiation 
Variable Description 
Differentiation 
through 
membership 
Different members types The TCG initiative allows for different types of 
memberships 
Member types description Lists the types of membership allowed, with a short 
explanation of the differences 
CBDR indicators used for 
differentiating members 
Criteria relating to CBDRs - such as capacity to pay, 
responsibility for GHG emissions, etc. - are used to 
differentiate across members of the initiative 
Different roles for developing and 
developed country members 
Members from developing and developed countries assume 
different roles within the TCG initiative 
Differentiation 
through 
support 
Funding and/or support available The TCG initiative offers or coordinates provision of 
funding or capacity building support to its members 
Funding and/or support offered 
specifically for developing 
countries 
The initiative offers or coordinates provision of funding, 
technology or capacity building support explicitly for actors 
in developing countries 
Differentiation 
through 
commitments 
and 
implementation 
Differentiation in implementation The implementation of commitments adopted within the 
initiative varies across members (e.g., longer deadlines) 
Differentiation in commitments The type or stringency of commitments adopted within the 
initiative varies across members 
Different activities by members Different members, even if they are of the same type, can 
choose different activities to pursue within the initiative 
Norms of 
differentiation 
CBDRs mentioned in website, 
mission, vision, charter 
The concept of CBDRs is mentioned in the main website, 
mission, vision or charter of the TCG initiative 
                                                
62 Roger et al., n. 33 above. See also Hale & Roger, n. 26 above; Bulkeley et al., n. 30 above; and M.J. 
Hoffmann, Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response After Kyoto 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) for earlier versions of the dataset.  
63 Michaelowa & Michaelowa, n. 28 above. 
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Equality of members mentioned in 
website, mission, vision, charter 
The idea of equality of members is mentioned in the main 
website, mission, vision or charter of the TCG initiative 
Justice, equity, similar wording 
mentioned 
Terms potentially alluding to CBDRs - such as justice, 
equity, etc. - are mentioned in the main website, mission, 
vision or charter of the TCG initiative 
Reference to UNFCCC principles The TCG initiative's main website, mission, vision or charter 
refers to the UNFCCC principles, even if those principles 
are not further explained or described 
Summary Description of differential 
treatment 
How this TCG initiative applies differential treatment 
Typical activity of organization Description of the typical activities of the TCG initiative 
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Table 3: List of TCG initiatives analyzed 
Name of initiative 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, own website discontinued. 
Information available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/2006/59162.htm.  
Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, available at: http://acccrn.net. 
BioCarbon Fund, available at: 
https://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&ItemID=9708&FID=9708. 
C40 cities, available at: http://www.c40.org. 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), available at: https://www.cdp.net. 
Carbon Rationing Action Groups, available at: 
https://grassrootsinnovations.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/crag-ih.pdf.  
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, available at: http://www.cslforum.org. 
Carbon Trust Standard, available at: https://www.carbontrust.com/client-
services/footprinting/footprint-certification/.  
Carbon War Room, available at: http://carbonwarroom.com. 
CarbonFix Standard, own website discontinued. Information available at: 
https://tellitsgreen.com/organic-logos/1088/carbonfix-standard/. 
Chicago Climate Exchange Offset Program (CCX), own website discontinued. Information 
available at: https://www.theice.com/ccx.  
Clean Air Initiative, available at: http://cleanairasia.org.  
Climate Action Reserve, available at: http://www.climateactionreserve.org. 
Climate Alliance of European Cities with Indigenous Peoples, available at: 
http://www.climatealliance.org/about-us.html. 
Climate Disclosure Standards Board, available at: http://www.cdsb.net. 
Climate Neutral Network, own website discontinued. Information available at: 
https://business.un.org/en/documents/8952. 
Climate Savers Computing Initiative, own website discontinued. Information available at: 
https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=join_change_the_world.showPledgeDriver
Details&cpd_id=16165. 
Climate Technology Initiative PFAN, available at: http://www.cti-pfan.net. 
Compact of Mayors, available at: http://www.compactofmayors.org. 
Compact of States and Regions, available at: 
https://www.theclimategroup.org/project/compact-states-and-regions.  
Covenant of Mayors, available at: http://www.covenantofmayors.eu. 
Divest-Invest Global Movement, available at: http://divestinvest.org. 
EUROCITIES Declaration on Climate Change, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/docs/0009/others/eurocities_en.pdf. 
Global GHG Register, available at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00818/WEB/OTHER/GLOBAL-5.HTM.  
Global Reporting Initiative, available at: https://www.globalreporting.org. 
Green-e (Climate Standards), available at: http://www.green-e.org. 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol, available at: http://www.ghgprotocol.org. 
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ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability, available at: http://www.iclei.org. 
ISO 14064/14065, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=38381. 
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, own website discontinued. Information 
available at: http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-climate-initiatives/mggra. 
Networked Carbon Markets Initiative, available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/globally-networked-carbon-markets.  
Partnership for Market Readiness, available at: https://www.thepmr.org.  
Pilot Auction Facility, available at: http://www.pilotauctionfacility.org. 
Prototype Carbon Fund, available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qR_EMgh4JnY&list=RDtpcBLVdXimU&index=7. 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), available at: 
http://www.reeep.org. 
Strategic Climate Fund, available at: http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/node/3.  
Sustainable Energy Finance Alliance, own website discontinued. Information available at: 
http://energy-base.org/project/previous-projects/#SEF.  
Under2MOU, available at: http://under2mou.org. 
UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), available at: http://www.unepfi.org.  
World Mayors’ Council on Climate Change, available at: 
http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org. 
 
 
3.1. Differentiation through Membership 
Of the 40 TCG initiatives analyzed, 14 divide their members into different categories. Most 
frequently, however, these different categories simply reflect the type of organization represented, 
such as local governments, central government agencies, NGOs, firms. While such categorization 
by itself does not imply differential treatment, it may allow for differentiating activities or 
obligations across the various members. However, even if different types of members engage in 
different activities, this does not necessarily reflect CBDRs in the way they are used in the 
multilateral climate regime. Since cities and firms, for example, simply have different societal 
functions, the type of climate-related activities they can perform will be different. Differentiation 
is then due to the nature of the actor involved, and not to its level of responsibility or capability to 
act on climate change.  
 
In three of the cases analyzed, the types of members reflect different level of financial 
commitments within the TCG initiative. For example, the Carbon Disclosure Project, 64  an 
initiative aimed at encouraging companies and investors to measure and disclose their GHG 
emissions and other climate-related risks, allows for ‘signatory investors’ and ‘member investors’, 
whereby the former pay no fees and the latter pay between USD $7000 and USD $9000 
depending on their economic size. By paying this fee, member investors have access to more 
detailed and easy-to-analyze emissions data of firms. In this case, the higher cost of participation 
yields a higher expected benefit – again, differential treatment is not related to CBDRs, but to 
                                                
64 N. 47 above. 
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expected gains from membership. In the case of the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR),65 in 
contrast, the type of membership is clearly related to CBDRs: while ‘contributing participants’ 
are those (Annex I) countries that provide funding to the Partnership and share their experiences 
with carbon pricing, ‘implementing country participants’ are all middle income (non-Annex I) 
countries that receive technical and financial support with the aim of implementing a carbon 
pricing policy.  
 
In summary, only in one of the cases analyzed, the PMR,66 do we see that the type of membership 
has a clear relationship with the CBDR principle, and particularly with its implementation based 
on the Annex I – non-Annex I dichotomy. If its goals are achieved, this initiative will entail high 
costs for its developing country members, as they will implement carbon pricing policies. Such 
policies cause implementation costs to the governments (particularly in terms of monitoring and 
enforcing compliance), and also to the sectors, firms and consumers affected by the carbon price. 
While, depending on the policy’s design, the government can implement a system to redistribute 
the carbon price to the population, firms with higher emissions levels will face higher costs of 
either emitting or reducing carbon, and all firms will face some kind of transaction costs. The 
PMR is clearly also an initiative that explicitly seeks to promote mitigation in developing 
countries. That it offers support to these countries is therefore within our stated expectations.  
 
3.2. Differentiation through Support 
Nine of the TCG initiatives analyzed offer some kind of financial, technical, or capacity building 
support (beyond simple networking and exchange of own experiences), and this support is always 
targeted towards members or participants located in developing countries. It can thus be inferred 
that these initiatives provide for a differentiated treatment of developing country actors. Of the 
nine initiatives, two (the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network67 and the Strategic 
Climate Fund68) aim to facilitate resilience or adaptation in developing countries, four aim to 
promote carbon markets in developing countries (the BioCarbon Fund,69 the PMR,70 the Pilot 
Auction Facility,71 and the Prototype Carbon Fund72), two offer support for the development or 
deployment of mitigation or clean energy technologies (the Climate Technology Initiative 
PFAN73  and REEEP74 ), and one is a network of cities (the C40 Cities Climate Leadership 
Group75), which has recently started to partner with other organizations to offer funding for 
climate-related actions in developing country cities. Interestingly, at least two of these initiatives 
(the Prototype Carbon Fund76 and the BioCarbon Fund,77 both aimed at supporting CDM projects 
                                                
65 N. 38 above.  
66 Ibid. 
67 N. 44 above.  
68 N. 37 above. 
69 N. 59 above. 
70 N. 38 above. 
71 Available at: http://www.pilotauctionfacility.org. 
72 Available at: https://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=PCF&FID=9707&ItemID=9707&ft=About. 
73 Available at: http://www.cti-pfan.net. 
74 N. 46 above.  
75 N. 34 above. 
76 N. 72 above. 
77 N. 59 above. 
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in developing countries) do not have any developing country members. Hence, they channel 
resources to developing countries even if these are not represented in their membership. 
 
In contrast, the initiatives that do not offer any meaningful support are mostly oriented towards 
networking activities (nine), promoting or setting standards for carbon reporting (seven), 
identification or promotion of particular mitigation technologies (four), setting standards for 
carbon offsetting (three), or promoting carbon markets within industrialized countries (two). 
These initiatives thus either do not entail high costs or benefits for their members, or they do not 
address developing country actors at all. Two further initiatives that do not directly offer support 
(the Compact of Mayors 78  and the Under2 Memorandum of Understanding 79 ) are aimed at 
establishing emissions reduction targets in subnational governments around the world. Even 
though the realization of their mission will entail important efforts and costs for the members, 
these initiatives do not offer substantial support.   
 
3.3. Differentiation through Commitments and Implementation 
Ten out of 40 initiatives differentiate in terms of the main commitments adopted by their 
members. Very frequently, this differentiation consists of a variation in financial membership 
contributions depending on the willingness of the members (five), their (economic) size (two), 
and/or whether they are in OECD countries (one). In three cases, the participating subnational 
governments commit to climate-related targets which are either self-differentiated (each 
participant chooses the target that it deems appropriate), or determined with reference to national-
level targets (which can themselves be differentiated). Of these cases, the five ones differentiating 
with respect to economic size, OECD membership or types of climate-related targets could be 
considered to be driven by CBDRs considerations. Meeting such emissions targets can be 
considered to entail significant costs for their members.  
 
However, none of the five initiatives aim to promote mitigation or adaptation specifically in 
developing countries. Three are networks of subnational governments either at European or 
global level, and the other two are networks of financial institutions supporting sustainable energy 
investments worldwide. In sum, differentiation in terms of main commitments does not seem to 
be a common tool for addressing CBDRs in transnational climate initiatives.  
 
In contrast, at least 17 TCG initiatives allow their members considerable leeway in terms of the 
activities they may pursue within the initiative, or the means by which to implement the adopted 
commitments. This seems a rather common way towards differentiation between members, 
although it is relatively opaque in terms of whether the differentiation is related to the 
responsibility or capability of members to act on climate change. This form of differentiation will 
be analyzed in detail in two specific case studies in Section 4 below.  
 
Setting some type of emissions reduction target is the type of commitment that most closely 
corresponds to the goals of the old Kyoto-based climate regime. It could therefore be expected 
that the TCG initiatives promoting such targets are likely to foster differentiation. Eleven of the 
                                                
78 Available at: http://www.compactofmayors.org. 
79 Available at: http://under2mou.org. 
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40 initiatives analyzed establish some kind of emissions target for their participants. Three of 
these allow members to self-differentiate with respect to their targets, and six allow members to 
use different means for reaching their targets. None provide meaningful financial or technical 
support, beyond specific accounting tools for setting and monitoring the targets. For these 11 
TCG initiatives that set emissions targets, Figure 1 shows the share of participants located in 
Annex I and non-Annex I countries. At the top of the graph are TCG initiatives involving 
subnational governments; at the bottom are those involving a wider variety of actors, which may 
include businesses or even individuals. Three of the initiatives (the Climate Alliance of European 
Cities with Indigenous Peoples,80 the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord,81 and the 
Chicago Climate Exchange82) are specifically oriented towards actors in Annex I countries. But 
all others also display a majority of members being located in Annex I countries, a finding that is 
in line with other studies of TCG initiatives.83 It might well be that the lack of support – despite 
the opportunity to differentiate commitments or their implementation – is related to the relatively 
low participation within developing countries. 
  
Figure 1: TCG initiatives setting emissions reduction targets: Share of participants located 
in Annex I and non-Annex I countries  
 
 
 
3.4. Differential Norms 
At the normative level, very little evidence is found that TCG initiatives seek to explicitly align 
themselves with the UNFCCC principles of fairness, equity, and CBDRs. Only two of the 40 
initiatives analyzed make a reference to CBDRs or to (part of an) UNFCCC principle on their 
                                                
80 Available at: http://www.climatealliance.org/about-us.html. 
81 Own website discontinued. Information available at: http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-
climate-initiatives/mggra. 
82 N. 39 above. 
83 Bulkeley et al., n. 26 above; Widerberg & Pattberg, n. 28 above; Chan & Van Asselt, n. 30 above. 
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websites. The UNEP Finance Initiative,84 a partnership between UNEP and the financial sector 
that seeks to incorporate environmental considerations in their financial assessments, explains 
that its Climate Change Working Group explicitly prioritizes developing and emerging countries, 
‘given the overarching principle of’ CBDRs in the UNFCCC, the historical responsibility of 
industrialized countries, and the increasing need for climate change action in emerging and 
developing countries.85 The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate states 
that its partners will choose the nature of its participation in its activities ‘in accordance to 
national circumstances’.86 While this is not a direct reference to CBDRs, it is a wording used 
frequently in the UNFCCC negotiations to reflect the different capabilities of countries.  
 
Beyond these two examples, none of the initiatives analyzed mentions CBDRs or related 
normative language (equity, fairness, capabilities, national circumstances) in the main sections of 
their websites. On a normative level, TCG initiatives probably attempt to keep their distance from 
the politically sensitive CBDR discussions, although several of them did implement differential 
treatment provisions in practice. This seems to be in line with the TCG initiatives’ goal of 
overcoming the UNFCCC-paralysis and starting action on the ground.  
 
As expected, TCG initiatives that entail high costs for their members are more likely to 
incorporate differential treatment provisions. This points towards a pragmatic application of 
CBDRs in the sense that the principle does not seem to be applied by all (or a majority of) TCG 
initiatives, but only by those that have important distributional effects that can be improved upon 
by applying a differentiated treatment. Levelling the playing field for participants in a TCG 
initiative is arguably more important in those initiatives involving higher costs, and what we 
observe empirically supports this idea. In addition, TCG initiatives that seek to promote 
mitigation or adaptation in developing countries are more likely to incorporate differential 
treatment provisions. In this case, given the very aim of the initiative focuses on improving 
climate policy implementation in developing countries, it is not surprising that differential 
treatment is introduced as a way of supporting this aim.  
 
The other two expectations – that TCG initiatives offering large benefits to its members are more 
likely to incorporate differential treatment provisions, and that TCG initiatives started by actors 
from developing countries are more likely to refer to CBDRs on their websites or in their mission 
statements (see Table 1) – do not seem to be supported by the findings so far. As only one of the 
initiatives was set up by a developing country (the Clean Air Initiative87), we cannot draw 
meaningful conclusions. But we do have considerable evidence for the opposite proposition: from 
the 40 initiative analyzed, 23 were started by industrialized countries. Of those, only one refers to 
‘national circumstances’ on its website, but even this initiative refrains from mentioning CBDRs 
explicitly. It is not surprising that initiatives launched by Annex I countries – those seeking to 
overcome the annex-based differentiation in the intergovernmental regime – refrain from 
emphasizing CBDRs.   
                                                
84 N. 57 above. 
85 Available at: http://www.unepfi.org/work-streams/climate-change/outreach/. 
86 Available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/2006/59162.htm. 
87 Available at: http://cleanairasia.org. 
 
 
19 
 
4. CBDRs IN THE COMPACT OF STATES AND REGIONS AND IN THE COMPACT 
OF MAYORS 
 
Subnational governance initiatives are some of the most prominent examples of TCG initiatives. 
In September 2014, at the United Nations (UN) Climate Summit,88 two new such initiatives were 
launched by groups of international organizations, NGOs and existing networks: the Compact of 
States and Regions89 and the Compact of Mayors.90 Both seek to establish emissions reduction 
targets at the regional, state or city level, respectively. Under both schemes, each member freely 
chooses the level of the target and the activities to reach the target. This is similar to the type of 
differentiation introduced in the Paris Agreement:91 each participant self-differentiates according 
to its own assessment of its capabilities and responsibilities. Both initiatives require participants 
to take several steps to establish, monitor, and report their targets, including announcing the target 
and its base year, as well as setting up a GHG emissions inventory and reporting regularly on 
climate-related data. The Compact of Mayors, in addition, asks participants to prepare plans 
showing how they intend to achieve the proposed targets, and also provides the opportunity to 
establish adaptation-related goals and plans. 
 
While both initiatives were started simultaneously and have a similar structure, their uptake by 
developing country participants has been quite different so far. The following sections seek to 
explain the differences by looking more in detail into how CBDRs have been operationalized in 
both initiatives. 
 
4.1. The Compact of States and Regions 
Under the Compact of States and Regions, of the current 37 fully participating subnational 
governments, 34 are located in Annex I countries, and only three are in a non-Annex I country 
(all of them in Brazil). In addition, there are seven observer members, which have committed to 
publish an emissions inventory and adopt a target in a period of two years. Of these seven 
observers, five are located in non-Annex I countries (India, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, and South 
Africa).  
 
All 37 fully participating subnational governments have adopted an economy-wide GHG 
emissions reduction target by the year(s) 2020, 2030 and/or 2050. Given that the base years vary, 
and that past progress towards the targets also varies, it is not possible to make a clear assessment 
of which targets are most stringent. But the type of target may provide an indication of how 
regional governments self-differentiate in their implementation of the Compact. Of the 34 regions 
located in Annex I countries, 32 adopt an absolute target below a given base year – the type of 
target adopted by Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol and also most frequently under the 
Paris Agreement. The two other Annex I regions adopt a target with reference to per capita 
emissions (Bavaria, Germany), and a target with reference to business-as-usual emissions 
                                                
88 Available at: http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/. 
89 Available at: https://www.theclimategroup.org/project/compact-states-and-regions. 
90 N. 69 above.  
91 N. 22 above. 
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(Alberta, Canada) – i.e. the emissions projected to occur without climate-related efforts in the 
year of the target. Of the three non-Annex I (Brazilian) regions with emissions reduction targets, 
only Sao Paulo has adopted an absolute target below a given base year. The other two have 
adopted targets with reference to emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP), and with 
reference to business-as-usual emissions. These relative targets or targets with respect to future 
emissions provide developing countries with more flexibility to deal with the difficulty of 
establishing future baselines in their fast-growing economies. In this sense, they are a way of 
dealing with the different circumstances and capabilities of developing countries.  
 
We see that the Compact of States and Regions, a relatively new transnational climate 
governance initiative, follows the developments that have been witnessed recently in the 
multilateral negotiations: developing country governments start to participate in establishing 
country-wide targets, but the targets are frequently expressed in a way that allows them flexibility 
to keep growing. In addition, by allowing the participation of observers, who have the intention 
but not yet the capability (e.g., in terms of recent GHG inventory data) to adopt an emissions 
reduction target, the Compact allows more subnational governments, particularly from 
developing countries, to signal a serious commitment to adopt such a target in the recent future. 
Again, this time-flexibility is in line with the idea of CBDRs, but given that the flexibility is 
provided for all potential members of the initiative – and not particularly for developing country 
regions – this operationalization of CBDRs is more in line with the differentiation style under the 
Paris Agreement, instead of the Annex-based differentiation under the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol regime. The approach towards CBDRs in the Compact of States and Regions thus 
overcomes the Annex I – non-Annex I divide, allowing differentiation across all countries and 
also between regions within countries.  
 
At the normative level the Compact of States and Regions did refer to the different circumstances 
of the participating governments in its first disclosure report: ‘We all have different local 
circumstances and challenges to address, but through the Compact we demonstrate our collective 
commitment to climate action’, and ‘Through an annual assessment, state and regional 
governments are able to measure their emissions and set ambitious reduction goals, while 
acknowledging their different capabilities and circumstances.’ 92  However, the reference to 
capabilities and circumstances is balanced by mentioning also the participants’ collective 
commitment and ambitious goals.  
 
4.2. The Compact of Mayors 
The Compact of Mayors now groups 504 cities that have pledged to establish, monitor and report 
on an emissions reduction target. Of those participating cities, 210, or 42%, are located in 59 non-
Annex I countries across all continents - which is a substantially larger share and broader 
geographical representation than in the Compact of States and Regions. As in the Compact of 
States and Regions, participating cities are free to choose the level of their targets and the means 
by which to achieve them. Self-differentiation is thus also the rule in this initiative. 
                                                
92 Compact of States and Regions, Disclosure Report 2015. Available at: 
https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/compact-of-states-and-regions-disclosure-report-
2015.pdf, pp. 2 and 5.   
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The Compact of Mayors assigns ‘badges’ to cities as soon as they complete one of the steps 
involved in the target-setting cycle. According to these badges, to date 49 participating cities have 
completed and published their emissions inventory, 15 of them (31%) from non-Annex I 
countries. Preparing such an emissions inventory requires relatively good capacity and technical 
resources. Emissions reduction targets have been announced by 67 cities, of which 22 (33%) in 
non-Annex I countries. While the share of developing country participants completing this step is 
similar to those completing the inventory, in absolute terms more cities seem to be able to 
establish a target than to complete the inventory. Of the 56 cities that have completed a climate 
plan, 18 (32%) are from developing countries.   
 
In sum, despite very similar designs, developing country cities appear to be participating more 
and performing better under the Compact of Mayors than developing country states or regions 
under the Compact of States and Regions. While the design in terms of incorporating 
differentiation or operationalizing CBDRs in the two initiatives does not account for these 
differences, two further factors may provide an explanation. Firstly, based on the content of their 
websites, the Compact of Mayors seems to be somewhat better organized in providing access to a 
variety of tools and standards that help to prepare each of the steps envisaged in setting up and 
monitoring a target – from registering the commitment, through preparing the inventory, creating 
targets and metrics, to establishing an action plan. Secondly, the support available from other 
global city networks, as well as the experience that cities have gained within them, may already 
have improved the capacity of world cities to establish climate targets and plans. More research is 
needed to ascertain to what extent the cities involved in the Compact of Mayors were already 
participating in pre-existing city initiatives. But in any case, these differences suggest that the 
provision of support is important to ensure participation and implementation of TCG initiatives in 
developing countries.  
 
At the normative level, the Compact of Mayors does not seem to refer to CBDRs or 
differentiation either on its website or in its first progress report. On the contrary, it emphasizes 
that any ‘city or town in the world may commit to the Compact of Mayors—regardless of size or 
location’, and that its goal is to establish a ‘common platform’ for consistent and standardized 
reporting.93   
 
The case studies show that TCG initiatives do seek to incorporate the concerns of members that 
may not yet have the capability to participate fully, thereby providing for a practical and flexible 
application of CBDRs through self-differentiation. The Compact of Mayors seems to be better 
organized in terms of providing support for the participating cities, which may account for the 
differences in level of participation and implementation by developing country members. While 
the Compact of States and Regions explicitly acknowledges differences in capabilities and 
circumstances, the Compact of Mayors seems to try to emphasize commonalities. Yet neither 
initiative seems to attempt to enter the discussion about CBDRs on a more political level.  
  
                                                
93 Available at: http://www.compactofmayors.org/ 
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
The common but differentiated responsibilities of states with respect to climate change is one of 
the basic principles upon which the UNFCCC institutionalized a strongly differentiated regime 
for sharing the burden of fighting climate change. In the past few years, however, this 
institutionalized differentiation between the Annex I and non-Annex I countries has started to 
erode, giving rise to a broader and more diverse set of commitments by country parties, the 
institutionalization of which culminated in the Paris Agreement. In parallel to these developments, 
transnational climate governance initiatives have emerged, partly as a way of supporting 
implementation of the regime at levels beyond the national government, but also as a means of 
finding solutions to the long-term political deadlock that pervaded the multilateral climate 
negotiations. 
 
However, TCG initiatives are faced with similar challenges to those that have plagued the 
UNFCCC process: they need to cater to the different levels of capacity and responsibility of their 
members. This article is a first attempt to explore empirically whether and how these initiatives 
address CBDRs. 
 
While it is clear that several TCG initiatives establish different categories of membership, there is 
little evidence that these categories are meant to address CBDRs. Rather, the categories reflect the 
different nature of the participants in those initiatives – from multinational firms, to NGOs or 
subnational governments, with different sizes and functions. Only one initiative, the Partnership 
for Market Readiness, which seeks to promote carbon pricing and markets in developing 
countries, displays member types that reflect CBDRs in terms of the Annex I – non-Annex I 
dichotomy.  
 
Further evidence indicates that TCG initiatives frequently attempt to level the playing field for 
their members through the provision of financial, technical, and capacity-building support. 
Interestingly, the support is always targeted towards developing and emerging countries. 
However, provision of support is observed in only nine of the 40 TCG initiatives analyzed. This 
might still be insufficient to address the more limited capabilities of (potential) participants in 
developing countries, particularly in poorer ones. It is thus likely that the limited attempt by 
existing TCG initiatives to address the different capacities of (potential) participants contributes 
to the bias towards the North that has been observed in previous studies of participation in these 
initiatives. Maybe stronger efforts to provide financial, technical, or capacity-building support to 
participants from the South, as a more thoughtful consideration of CBDRs, would help to 
improve participation and implementation in developing countries. The case studies on the 
Compact of Mayors and the Compact of States and Regions reinforce this idea. 
 
Little evidence is found for the idea that TCG initiatives differentiate the central commitments to 
be adopted by their members as a means to address CBDRs. There is, however, more evidence 
that differentiation in implementation is more widespread in TCG initiatives, e.g., by providing 
the participants with flexibility to decide how to comply with their commitments. Almost no 
evidence supports the idea that TCG initiatives seek to engage in the CBDR discussion at a 
 
 
23 
normative or political level. While TCG initiatives address differentiation in practice, they mostly 
abstain from relating it to the existing CBDR discussion in the multilateral arena. Regarding the 
drivers for the inclusion of differential treatment in TCG initiatives, there is evidence mostly for 
the expectation that high costs and the goal of promoting mitigation or adaptation in developing 
countries increase the likelihood of including differential treatment in an initiative. 
 
In sum, TCG initiatives address differentiation in a pragmatic and goal-oriented way, while 
mostly abstaining from reflecting CBDRs in a normative or political manner. What does this 
mean, both for the CBDR principle and for the TCG initiatives? For the CBDR principle, what 
we observe in TCG initiatives very closely mirrors – and maybe even precedes – what has been 
observed in the multilateral regime: instead of the operationalization across North-South lines, 
more nuanced forms of differentiation, and particularly self-differentiation, are the new norm. For 
the TCG initiatives, this pragmatic view of differentiation is an opportunity, in the sense that it 
avoids the strong politicization that hindered the multilateral regime. TCG initiatives are, after all, 
voluntary undertakings: if an actor does not agree with their goals or provisions, they can just 
abstain from participating, or choose another initiative that better caters to their needs. This also 
points towards the main risk for TCG initiatives: so far, their uptake by developing country 
participants (by those participants arguably most in need of support for implementing climate-
related goals) has been limited. CBDRs and differentiation – particularly through more targeted 
offers of support – may improve such uptake and, hence, in the long term, may enhance the 
global relevance and effectiveness of TCG initiatives.  
 
